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MEASURING THE SOCIAL COSTS AND
BENEFITS AND IDENTIFYING THE VICTIMS
OF SUBORDINATING SECURITY INTERESTS
IN BANKRUPTCY
Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr.t
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, some legal scholars have questioned the utility
and fairness of security interests and the favorable treatment afforded
security interests in bankruptcy. More recently, a few have made con-
crete proposals for subordinating security interests to tort and other
claims in bankruptcy. Unlike many earlier theoretical explorations of
secured debt, the subordination proposals acknowledge that evaluat-
ing the effects of affording priority to secured claims in bankruptcy
turns on the answers to a number of difficult empirical questions. As
of yet, however, none of the subordination proponents has addressed
these questions in any detail.
In this Article, we suggest several approaches for quantifying the
major social costs and benefits likely to result from adoption of a sub-
ordination proposal. In particular, we focus on the costs of contrac-
tions in the amount of credit that would be extended if a
subordination proposal were enacted into law. We also consider
claims that affording priority to secured claims in bankruptcy pro-
motes inefficient, less prudent conduct.
I
THE SUBORDINATION PROPOSALS
Since 1994, no one has seriously questioned that at least some
secured transactions provide benefits that offset any costs imposed on
a debtor's unsecured creditors.' One finds evidence of this recogni-
t The authors are, respectively, Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, and
Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. They serve as Reporters for the
Drafting Committee to Revise Uniform Commercial Code Article 9. The views expressed
in this Article are not necessarily those of the Drafting Committee or its sponsors-the
American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. The authors thank David Carlson, Richard Hasen, Richard McAdams, Randal
Picker, Eric Posner, and Paul Shupack for their helpful comments.
1 Paul Shupack should be credited with an early explanation of this insight. Paul M.
Shupack, Solving the Puzzle of Secured Transactions, 41 RUTGERS L. REv. 1067, 1093-1121
(1989).
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tion in at least three of the articles that appeared in a symposium issue
of the Virginia 'Law Review in 1994.2 One benefit probably is the most
obvious: security can facilitate extensions of credit that creditors
otherwise would not make, and debtors can use the credit extended to
create wealth. Stated otherwise, the institution of secured credit is not
necessarily harmful to unsecured creditors as a class. For example, se-
cured credit that enables a debtor to pay unsecured creditors for
goods and services or that reduces a debtor's risk of insolvency can
benefit those creditors. Consider, as well, that those business debtors
that become insolvent while leaving material debts unpaid are, we sus-
pect, a distinct minority. The net effect of secured credit on un-
secured creditors is an empirical issue that remains to be
demonstrated conclusively.3
2 David Gray Carlson, On the Efficiency of Secured Lending, 80 VA. L. REv. 2179, 2181-98
(1994); Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Security Interests:
Taking Debtors' Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REv. 2021, 2025-47 (1994); Lynn M. LoPucki, The
Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1892-1923 (1994). Volume 80:8 of the
Virginia Law Review, in which these articles appear, contains the papers and commentary
delivered at a 1993 conference in Charlottesville commemorating the commencement of
the project to revise UCC Article 9.
3 In their recent article, Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried acknowledge the central
role of empirical questions concerning the costs and benefits of secured credit. Lucian
Arye Bebchuk &Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy,
105 YALE L.J. 857, 913-29 (1996). In our article, we explained:
In the absence of empirical data it is . .. impossible to conclude
whether giving security generally transfers wealth from unsecured creditors to
secured creditors. Research that focuses only on creditors of debtors that
actually become insolvent cannot possibly answer the question; everyone
knows that collateral provides a comparative advantage to the secured cred-
itor in that situation.
Harris & Mooney, supra note 2, at 2036 (emphasis added). In his recent study, Steven
Schwarcz refined our point in arguing that secured credit often is beneficial to unsecured
creditors:
This Article ... adopts a new term, "class Pareto efficiency," reflecting
that the proper unit of analysis is the class and not the individual. A trans-
action is class Pareto efficient if it is Pareto efficient when viewing each class
of persons affected by the class of transactions as a single collective per-
son .... Class Pareto efficiency is therefore a useful way of assessing the
policy impact of an action on affected groups, such as the policy impact of
secured credit on unsecured creditors.
New money secured credit appears to be class Pareto efficient, and
therefore efficient from a policy standpoint .... Unsecured creditors as a
class [are] better off because the availability of secured credit increases
debtor liquidity and therefore increases the expected value of unsecured
claims.
Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 DuKE LJ.
(forthcoming Dec. 1997) (July 3, 1997 manuscript at 62-63, on file with authors); see also
RonaldJ. Mann, The Role of Secured Credit in Small Business Lending, 86 GEO. L.J. (forthcom-
ing 1997) (Feb. 24, 1997 manuscript at 45-47, on file with authors) (expressing doubt that
secured financing is materially adverse to the interests of unsecured creditors).
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This Part offers a brief overview of three articles that argue in
favor of subordinating secured claims to tort claims and certain other
claims.
In his 1991 article, David Leebron explored proposals to elimi-
nate limited liability for corporate shareholders.4 The kernel of his
analysis recognized that limited liability permits corporations to exter-
nalize risk, with the result that corporations engage in behavior that is
inefficient-i.e., too risky.5 Tort victims bear the risk and costs of this
negative externality.6 Leebron also pointed out that the same result
occurs by virtue of the treatment of debt in insolvency proceedings,
inasmuch as unsecured debt receives pani passu treatment with tort
claims.7 And, he explained, the priority afforded to secured claims
exacerbates the problem.8 Consequently, he called for the subordina-
tion of both secured and unsecured claims to tort claims on efficiency
grounds.9
There are both useful insights in and powerful arguments against
Leebron's proposal. For present purposes, however, two points are
sufficient. First, Leebron's proposal is designed to provide incentives
that will induce optimal (efficient) risk and care on the part of com-
mercial actors. It is not his purpose either to increase compensation
to tort victims or to maximize recoveries by other unsecured creditors.
Although Leebron's conclusions have been cited by those who find
fault with the existing secured-credit regime on distributional
grounds, 10 Leebron's normative principle is efficiency, not "fairness"
or "distributive justice." Second, Leebron does not appear to take se-
riously the possibility that unsecured creditors might benefit from af-
fording priority to secured claims."
4 David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REv.
1565 (1991) (suggesting, but ultimately rejecting, the idea).
5 Id at 1570-74.
6 See id. at 1574, 1600-05.
7 Id. at 1637-40.
8 I. at 1646-49.
9 Id. at 1650. Leebron was not the first to suggest this possibility. See Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts,
100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1902 & n.66 (1991) (suggesting, but ultimately rejecting, the idea).
10 See LoPucki, supra note 2, at 1888-89 ("The institution of security has a ... bad
reputation. Its most persistent image is that of families forced from home or farm through
foreclosure. Most noneconomists wish that things could be different. We are rooting for
the underdog, which means we are rooting against security.") (footnote omitted).
1 One might think that so long as the security granted does not exceed the
value transferred to the debtor, the tort victim does not lose, and indeed
might gain. But as Alan Schwartz has demonstrated, this proposition is du-
bious and depends on the unrealistic assumption that the funds will be in-
vested in a project that is risk free or yields returns that are negatively
correlated with the other businesses of the borrower.
Leebron, supra note 4, at 1646-47 (citing Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J.
LEGAL STUD. 209, 228-34 (1989)). As David Carlson has pointed out, Schwartz's model
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In his Virginia Law Review article, Lynn LoPucki built on Leeb-
ron's analysis in urging the subordination of security interests to tort
creditors in bankruptcy.1 2 Like Leebron, LoPucki grounded his pro-
posal largely on the argument that forcing debtors to internalize the
costs of injury to others will induce debtors to reduce the amount of
tortious injury they cause.1 3 He argued that affording priority to tort
and surprised, consensual, unsecured creditors would cause secured
creditors to monitor debtors in a way that would make debtors behave
more carefully and therefore commit fewer torts.' 4 LoPucki also sug-
gested, as did Leebron, that current law, which affords security inter-
ests priority over tort claims, permits the debtor to externalize its
costs.' 5 As the proportion of a firm's assets provided by debt in-
creases, the proportion invested by the shareholders decreases,
thereby reducing the shareholders' risk and placing the risks on credi-
tors. By enabling secured creditors to receive the firm's assets ahead
of tort creditors, current law eliminates any incentive for secured cred-
itors to monitor the safety of the debtor's operations and products.
This, the argument goes, results in less care and more torts.' 6
Although Leebron explained that the pari passu treatment of consen-
sual unsecured creditors and tort claims has the same, but less pro-
nounced effects, 17 LoPucki did not advocate subordination of all
contractual, nontort claims to tort claims.
Unlike Leebron, LoPucki confronted countervailing considera-
tions, including the proposed system's impact on the cost and availa-
bility of credit.'8 But LoPucki resolved the empirical problem to his
satisfaction by imagining a market-based solution: tort priority insur-
ance-a product that insurers would develop and offer in response to
demands from secured parties wishing to insure themselves against
loss of their collateral to tort claimants.' 9
always assumes that the proceeds of secured loans immediately disappear. David Gray Carl-
son, Secured Lending as a Zero Sum Game 21-22 (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with authors).
12 LoPucki, supra note 2, at 1908-14. LoPucki also urged subordination of security
interests to certain unsecured claims held by consensual, nontort creditors. I at 1947-63.
Asserting that the risks imposed by their debtors' secured debt unfairly surprise a material
portion of consensual creditors, he proposed to subordinate security interests to the claims
of every unsecured consensual creditor unless 1) the secured party actually brought the
existence of the security interest to the attention of the prospective unsecured creditor, or
2) the unsecured creditor reasonably should have expected the existence of the security
interest. ML LoPucki's empirical assumption about the widespread surprise of unsecured
creditors seems implausible, at best.
'3 Id. at 1897-99.
'4 Id. at 1911-14.
15 Id
16 See id.
17 Leebron, supra note 4, at 1639-40.
18 LoPucki, supra note 2, at 1911-12.
19 Id, at 1912-13.
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In their recent article in the Yale Law Journa4 Lucian Bebchuk
andJesse Fried have attempted a more complete analysis of the effects
of legal rules governing priority, which generally afford secured credi-
tors priority over tort creditors and other "nonadjusting" creditors,20
and the potential effects of subordinating security interests to tort and
other nonadjusting creditors' claims. They offer alternative proposals.
One would subordinate security interests generally and fully to all
nonadjusting claims in bankruptcy.21 The other would treat a fixed,
statutorily imposed fraction (their example is 25%) of the secured
claim as an unsecured claim in bankruptcy.22
Bebchuk and Fried, like Leebron and LoPucki before them, base
their arguments on efficiency.23 Like LoPucki, and in contrast to
Leebron, Bebchuk and Fried pay attention to positive as well as nega-
tive externalities. 24 They identify externalities heretofore overlooked
or given little acknowledgment. 25 However, we question their conclu-
sions and empirical assumptions, especially those concerning eco-
nomic benefits of credit that would be extended under current law
but that would not be extended were one of their proposals adopted.
Two recent works in progress offer critiques of the Bebchuk and
Fried article. Steven Schwarcz develops arguments that we had previ-
ously made in the Virginia Law Review to the effect that secured credit
20 By "nonadjusting" creditors, the authors mean creditors that are unable, or that
rationally decline, to adjust the amount of credit they extend or the amount they charge
for credit to take into account risks imposed by the creation of security interests in favor of
other creditors. The category of "nonadjusting" creditors includes suppliers whose claims
are too small to warrant making adjustments and governmental entities holding claims for
taxes. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 3, at 864-65.
21 See it. at 905-09.
22 See id- at 909-11. They appear to favor the fixed-fraction approach. IdM at 910-11
("Although a rule such as the 75% fixed-fraction rule would reduce but not eliminate the
inefficiencies identified in this Article, it might be preferable to the adjustable-priority rule
because it would create less uncertainty for secured creditors and would be somewhat eas-
ier to administer."). The terms "secured claim" and "unsecured claim" have the meaning
ascribed to them in the Bankruptcy Code. See it- at 859 n.1 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)
(1994)). Thus, an oversecured creditor-one whose collateral has a value in excess of the
amount of its claim-holds a secured claim equal to the amount of the claim, whereas an
undersecured creditor-one whose claim exceeds the value of its collateral-holds a se-
cured claim equal to the value of the collateral and an unsecured claim for the balance.
23 Having identified the efficiency costs associated with full priority, we also
have considered the desirability of a different approach-according only
partial priority to secured claims. Our analysis of partial priority has shown
that such a rule could eliminate or reduce these efficiency costs-and that
such an approach may well be more efficient than the full-priority rule.
Id- at 934.
24 Id. at 913-21 (discussing negative externalities of partial priority, i.e., positive exter-
nalities of full priority, including increased information acquisition costs, increased cost of
coordinating monitoring efforts, and reduced financing for desirable activities).
25 It at 895-903 (discussing inefficient security interests, distorted choices between
security and covenants, distorted investment and precaution decisions, suboptimal use of
covenants, and suboptimal enforcement efforts).
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can facilitate credit that otherwise would not be extended and that
this credit can create wealth and reduce the likelihood of default.26
He goes on to explain why firms may be reluctant to give security and
how secured credit can provide needed liquidity for troubled but via-
ble firms that are unable to borrow on an unsecured basis.27 He also
explains in detail how granting full priority to secured credit can in-
crease the expected value of unsecured claims. 28 David Carlson also
criticizes Bebchuk and Fried's conclusions and methodology.2 9 He
points out that, notwithstanding their more detailed explanations,
Bebchuk and Fried actually add little to the debate on secured
credit.30 Carlson argues that, by positing secured credit as a zero-sum
game and by conflating wealth transfers with social gains and losses,
Bebchuk and Fried make the same mistakes as several earlier
authors.31
This brief overview suggests some important implications for
scholarship and law-reform agendas alike. First, the subordination
proposals are based on efficiency grounds. Others may make a nor-
mative claim that it simply is "unfair" to elevate secured claims over
those of tort claimants and other nonadjusting creditors, even if the
subordination of security interests were inefficient and would reduce aggregate
wealth. But that normative claim will draw no support from these
proposals.
26 Schwarcz, supra note 3 (manuscript at 18-21).
27 I& (manuscript at 22-26). Of course, as we stressed in our article, providing liquid-
ity for troubled firms is only one illustration of the contexts in which credit would be
available only on a secured basis and can be used to create wealth. Harris & Mooney, supra
note 2, at 2025-45.
28 Schwarcz, supra note 3 (manuscript at 43-58).
29 Carlson, supra note 11 (manuscript at 57-79).
30 I, (manuscript at 58, 79).
31 Bebchuk and Fried claim to have demonstrated that some security interests
are efficient and some are not. They make no attempt to quantify whether
the efficient security interests predominate, or whether the inefficient ones
predominate. Indeed, at one point they suggest that not even firms who
issue security interests . . . know whether security interests will affect the
market value of their own assets. Given such a lack of knowledge, there is
no sense in trying to make policy on the basis of wealth maximization. To
do so would be irresponsible and unscientific....
Nevertheless, in spite of their lack of theoretical grounding, Bebchuk
and Fried do not hesitate to offer two policy suggestions. First, they suggest
that secured claims be subordinated only to those creditors who have been
exposed to uncompensated risk. Second, they suggest that all secured
claims be taxed by 25% in bankruptcy proceedings in order to make se-
cured credit more risky.
In effect, Bebchuk and Fried started to build an investment model. In
the middle of doing so, they forgot their premises and reverted back to the
zero sum baseline, in which all investments have already taken place. This
unacknowledged shift to premises completely invalidates their findings.
I& (manuscript at 69-70, 78).
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Second, these proposals suggest a rich field in which legal schol-
ars may join hands with those in other disciplines to study credit.
Testing more fully the empirical assumptions and hypotheses that un-
derlie these and other proposals will be difficult, but may be both re-
warding and surprising. It will require more serious consideration of
the direct and indirect economic effects of extensions of credit that
solvent and insolvent debtors in fact repay. And it will require study of
those insolvent debtors that resolve their financial affairs outside of
bankruptcy.
As long as bankruptcy debtors are a small minority not only of all
debtors but of insolvent debtors as well, narrowly focusing only on
bankruptcy debtors will teach little about the full effects of secured
credit. Bankruptcy rules have consequences outside bankruptcy, espe-
cially in the process of credit extension. No one could believe that
everything in the credit markets would remain constant under subor-
dination rules except that secured creditors would hand over money to
unsecured creditors in bankruptcy proceedings. In particular, we are
wary of assertions that professional secured creditors oppose the sub-
ordination proposals because the proposals' adoption would take
wealth from them and give it to unsecured creditors. Imposition of a
subordination regime may, in fact, increase the aggregate losses that
secured creditors suffer in insolvency proceedings. But secured credi-
tors are likely to react to subordination rules by taking the new rules
into account when assessing their risks and making business decisions.
Once the dust settles, secured creditors may find that their returns
have not been adversely affected.
There is one way, of course, that some secured creditors could
lose under the subordination proposals. Secured creditors that can
exploit a market position to extend secured credit profitably under
current law might lose profits under a regime that would materially
contract their extensions of credit. Their alternative sources of invest-
ment may be less profitable. However, the bigger losers would be
those debtors that would receive less funding and those others that
would, consequently, be prevented from entering into transactions
with those debtors. If this account is accurate, then those who view
current law as "pro-secured creditor" necessarily must view current law
as even more "pro-debtor."32
32 See, e.g., Anthony Saunders & Ingo Walter, Annotated Project Outline, Proposed
Convention on Security Interests in, and Transfers and Leasing of, Aviation Mobile Equip-
ment: Economic Impact Assessment 30-33 (June 25, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with authors) (estimating, based on stock market data, that recent clarifications to
Bankruptcy Code § 1110, which affords certain financers and lessors of transportation
equipment enhanced rights to be paid currently or to take possession of the equipment,
increased the capitalized future earnings for the four airlines included in the Standard &
Poor's airline index (i.e., debtors and lessees) by $442.8 million, or 4.65% of the previous
1997] 1355
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II
ESTIMATING THE SOCIAL COSTS OF THE SUBORDINATION
PROPOSALS
In this Part we consider how two significant effects of the subordi-
nation proposals might be quantified. We suggest a research agenda,
not definitive conclusions. We first consider the costs of contractions
of credit extensions, including the costs imposed on debtors' un-
secured creditors, that would result from adopting the subordination
proposals as measured against the resulting benefits for unsecured
creditors (i.e., larger distributions). Second, we consider the argu-
ment that subordinating secured claims would reduce a negative ex-
ternality that current law creates-the inducement of debtors to
externalize risk, resulting in more risky behavior.
A. Costs of Credit Contractions and Benefits of Increased
Distributions
Our article in the Virginia Law Review explains how secured credit
may benefit unsecured creditors generally, although it has the effect
of subordinating unsecured claims against debtors that enter bank-
ruptcy.33 One major benefit is the facilitation of credit that creditors
otherwise would not extend. We hypothesize that adopting the subor-
dination proposals would materially reduce credit available to dis-
tressed businesses, and that the costs of the credit contraction would
swamp the benefits of increased distributions in bankruptcy for the
promoted classes of creditors.3 4
In his work in progress, Steven Schwarcz explains why credit
might be available to an insolvent debtor only on a secured basis and
equity value of the airlines). These authors also observed: "It should be noted that the
upgrade of airline debt and its commensurate reduction in financing costs attributable to
the proposed Convention for non-U.S. airlines is likely to be significantly greater than the
upgrade attributable to the Bankruptcy Reform Act's clarification of Section 1110 in the
United States." Id. (manuscript at 33). The Convention to which the authors refer is the
Draft Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, which would cover se-
curity interests in and leases of high-value mobile equipment such as aircraft, railroad roll-
ing stock, satellites, and ships. The International Institute for the Unification of Private
Law, in Rome, sponsors work on the Convention.
33 In brief, our Virginia Law Review article explains that debtors may have access to
more credit under the existing legal regime, which validates secured transactions, than
they would if all credit were unsecured. We argue that the additional credit may increase
the expected value of unsecured claims by, inter alia, reducing the probability of the
debtor's default, providing a source of repayment to unsecured creditors, and enabling the
debtor to remain in business and conclude future transactions. Harris & Mooney, supra
note 2.
34 It is implausible to assume that risk-neutral lenders would be willing to extend the
same amount of credit, but with an increased risk premium. As Paul Shupack has ex-
plained, "[a]t some level of risk, the model [of secured lending] must allow otherwise risk-
neutral creditors to cease lending." Shupack, supra note 1, at 1097.
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how a subordination regime "would create an economic disincentive
that would cause many potential lenders simply to refuse to make
loans to debtors."3 5 Contractions in available credit might also come
in the form of loans made in a smaller amount. The conventional
wisdom in the credit markets supports our hypothesis that the con-
traction of credit is likely to be material, inasmuch as subordination of
a security interest would diminish the collateral value on which a se-
cured lender could rely.3 6
Estimating the aggregate costs of credit contraction that one could ex-
pect from adopting the subordination proposals would require an ini-
tial estimate of the aggregate amount of credit contraction. Upon settling
on an estimate of the latter sum, it would then be possible to estimate,
by using a multiplier based on a variety of economic assumptions,3 7
the aggregate costs. These costs then could be compared with the
aggregate amount of increased distributions in insolvency'proceedings (or
otherwise) that would flow from adoption of the subordination pro-
posals.38 In each case, assumptions as to the precise subordination
formula-e.g., subordinate secured claims to tort claims, subordinate
secured claims to the claims of nonadjusting creditors, or treat 25% of
the secured claim as unsecured-would influence the estimates. In
reality, we doubt that anyone could generate a meaningful estimate of
the actual amounts of these costs and benefits for the entire United
States (or any other) economy. For example, even with complete and
accurate data on distributions in bankruptcy, how would one accu-
rately take into account costs arising out of informal negotiations in
the shadow of bankruptcy priority rules? Although developing a
35 See Schwarcz, supra note 3 (manuscript at 36).
36 See, e.g.,Joe Rizzi, GaugingDebt Capacity, CORP. CASHFLOW, Feb. 1994, at 33, 34 ("As-
set-based lending can increase the debt capacity of middle-market or noninvestment-grade
firms with strong tangible asset bases but low or volatile cash flow streams. Standard ad-
vance rates against eligible accounts receivable, inventory and net property, plant and
equipment are 80%, 50% and 40%, respectively."); see also Jim Embree, Commercial Loan
Risk Ratings for Collateral and Control, Bus. CREDrr, July-Aug. 1995, at 12 (explaining how
collateral is rated according to its liquidity, marketability, and value, and how the rating
affects the availability of credit). Some disagree with the conventional wisdom. See Ronald
J. Mann, Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt, 96 MICH. L. REv. (forthcoming
Nov. 1997) (Apr. 29, 1997 manuscript at 81-82, on file with authors) (reporting that 1) an
insurance company executive was not confident that adoption of a fixed-fraction subordi-
nation proposal applicable both in and out of bankruptcy would have a significant long-
term effect on the amount of credit extended, and 2) a banking executive predicted that
adoption would have no effect whatsoever on bank lending).
37 One might assume, for example, that the supply of credit is sufficient to provide an
appropriate amount of credit to creditworthy borrowers.
38 As with an estimate of wealth losses arising out of contractions of credit, an esti-
mate of wealth gains from increased distributions in insolvency proceedings would require
assumptions concerning the uses to which the distributions would be put. Wealth transfers
alone do not represent wealth increases and do not have any necessary efficiency
implications.
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meaningful estimate of aggregate amounts may not be possible, esti-
mating the relative amounts of the costs of credit contraction and ben-
efits of increased distributions in identified samples may be. There
are several plausible approaches. 3 9
Initially, it will be necessary to identify market segments in which
anecdotal evidence and common knowledge indicate that secured
credit plays an important role. Examples are the markets for financ-
ing agricultural production, the acquisition of commercial aircraft
and other equipment, credit secured by financial assets such as securi-
ties (at both the wholesale and retail levels), securitization transac-
tions, and credit for small commercial, retail, and industrial
businesses. The next step will be to identify a manageable sample.
Possibilities abound. Some industries may collect data concerning
their members that is available for the asking. One also could use
questionnaires and interviews to survey relevant samples of market
participants. Analyses of the records of a sample of lenders with large
and diverse portfolios also might be useful. Those records and portfo-
lios also would support the study and analysis of data concerning the
borrowers who do not default, recoveries from those who do default,
the incidence of default, denials of credit, lending policies involving
loan-to-collateral ratios, results of nonbankruptcy workouts, and the
like.40
Another approach would draw from available data to create man-
ageable predictions.41 For example, assume one identifies a market
segment with 1000 firms, each holding assets valued at $125,000 and
39 Among the approaches we do not explore is to compare data from an economy
with a functional personal property security regime to data from an economy without one.
For example, recent studies by the World Bank predict that Bolivia's adoption of an effec-
tive personal property security law would cause interest rates to decrease and credit availa-
bility to increase, thereby resulting in a social gain equal to as much as two percent of the
Bolivian gross domestic product. See Heywood W. Fleisig et al., Legal Restrictions on Security
Interests Limit Access to Credit in Bolivia, 31 INT'L LAW. 65, 70 (1997); see also Saunders &
Walter, supra note 32 (manuscript at 33) (discussing the favorable economic impact on
non-United States airlines that would result from improving the effectiveness of personal
property security laws).
40 In his recent study of 74 problem loans originated by three lenders, Ronald Mann
suggests that, " [g ] iven the relative infrequency of bankruptcy and liquidation even in the
universe of distressed loans," the changes that would result from adoption of the subordi-
nation proposals "do not seem serious enough to have serious effects in the massive uni-
verse of cases in the market for loan origination." Mann, supra note 36 (manuscript at 80).
Given the diversity of lenders and credit markets, the possibility that a subordination re-
gime might not materially affect the extension of credit by some financers in some markets
is in no way inconsistent with the possibility that such a regime would materially affect
existing or future financings by the same financers in other markets or by those or other
financers in other markets.
41 The Federal Reserve Board's national survey of small business financing is likely to
be an important source of data. See Rebel A. Cole et al., Bank and Nonbank Competition for
Small Business Credit: Evidence from the 1987 and 1993 National Surveys of Small Business Fi-
nances, 82 FED. RESERvE BULL 983, 983-85 (1996).
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having borrowed $100,000 (.8 x $125,000) secured by all its assets.
Assume further that the evidence shows that lenders in this market
segment determine the amount of credit they are willing to extend by
reference to the value of the collateral. 42 Next, assume that, under
normal credit policies that take into account the risks of loss under
the existing full-priority regime, including the defacto partial subordi-
nation in bankruptcy, lenders have extended secured credit to the
firms in the identified market segment in an amount equal to 80% of
the value of the collateral. 4 3 Subordination rules increase the risk of
loss to secured parties by allocating to competing creditors some or all
of the collateral value. Thus, one would expect that under a subordi-
nation rule less secured credit would be extended. Assume that a
given subordination rule, whose details for the most part need not
concern us,44 decreases the value of collateral to secured lenders in
the identified market segment to such an extent that they would be
willing to extend credit in an amount equal to 70% of the value of
42 The use of loan-to-value ratios appears widespread with respect to both real prop-
erty and personal property collateral. In some instances, statutes set maximum loan-to-
value ratios. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 175, § 63 (West 1987) (generally limiting
mortgage loans by insurance companies to 75% of the fair market value of the real prop-
erty securing the loan). In other credit markets, lenders set them. See, e.g., P=R H. WEIL,
ASSET-BAsED LENDING 237 (1989) (describing the "borrowing base" for an inventory financ-
ing as "a percentage of the value of the inventory at the lower of cost or market"). The
Comptroller of the Currency, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Office of Thrift Supervision have adopted a uniform
rule requiring each supervised institution (national bank, state bank member of the Fed-
eral Reserve System, insured state nonmember bank, or savings association) to adopt and
maintain real-property lending policies that establish "[p]rudent underwriting standards,
including loan-to-value limits." See 12 C.F.R. § 34.62(b) (2) (ii) (1997) (Comptroller); id.
§ 208.52(b) (2) (ii) (Federal Reserve Board); id. § 365.2(b) (2) (ii) (Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corp.); id. § 560.101(b) (2) (ii) (Office of Thrift Supervision). Interagency guidelines
provide supervisory loan-to-value limits that an institution's internal limits should not ex-
ceed. See, e.g., Interagency Guidelines for Real Estate Lending Policies, id. § 560.101 app.
43 Bebchuk and Fried point to the fact that under current law (primarily Bankruptcy
Code Chapter 11) secured claims receive a defacto subordination (arising out of, for exam-
ple, delay, the automatic stay, unreasonably low collateral valuations, etc.). Bebchuk &
Fried, supra note 3, at 911-13. But this shows only that the current obstacles to enforcing
security interests in bankruptcy have not entirely eliminated the utility of collateral, as in our
example. On the other hand, if current law were to extend a more friendly hand to se-
cured claims in bankruptcy, then perhaps 85% or 90% financing, instead of 80%, might
have been more appropriate in the example.
44 One detail of the subordination rule does concern us. The example assumes that,
under the applicable rule, a secured party may hold a fully secured claim in bankruptcy.
For example, the rule might permit holders of unsecured claims to take collateral free of a
security interest only to the extent necessary to provide them ith a specified proportion of
the debtor's assets. In contrast, the subordination rules that Bebchuk and Fried proffer
preclude a creditor from ever being fully secured in bankruptcy. Id. at 905-11 (explaining
the extent to which a secured claim is treated as unsecured under the "adjustable-priority"
and "fixed-fraction priority" rules). The adverse consequences of being undersecured in
bankruptcy lead us to expect that a subordination rule taking the latter approach would
result in an even greater contraction of credit than we hypothesize in our example.
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collateral. This suggests that each borrower would be likely to borrow
$87,500 (.7 x $125,000), or $12,500 less than under the existing legal
regime, and that, of the $100,000,000 in aggregate credit extended
under the existing regime ($100,000/borrower x 1000 borrowers),
$12.5 million ($12,500/borrower x 1000 borrowers) would not be ex-
tended under the subordination rule.45 Now assume that 2%, or 20,
of the 1000 borrowers enter bankruptcy and that the collateral retains
its original value, $125,000.46 Of this value, $37,500 ($125,000 -
$87,500) would be available for distribution to unsecured creditors.
Of the $37,500, $25,000 would have been available under the existing
regime and an additional $12,500 becomes available as a consequence
of the subordination rule. Thus, under this scenario, aggregate se-
cured credit decreased by $12.5 million and the subordination rule
put $250,000 ($12,500/borrower x 20 bankrupt borrowers) in the
pockets of the unsecured creditors in bankruptcy.47 The devil is in
the numbers, of course, but resort to reliable data could inform the
example.
The contraction of secured credit in the example would not nec-
essarily result in the contraction of aggregate credit. For example, the
increased debtor equity in collateral and the operation of the subordi-
nation rule in bankruptcy might permit the debtors to offset the re-
duction in secured credit with unsecured credit.48 We think it
extremely unlikely that any increases in unsecured credit would offset
45 In fact, the reduction in aggregate credit extended to the identified firms may be
even greater. Some loans that might be made on the basis of an 80% loan-to-value ratio
might not be made at all under a partial subordination regime. For example, a firm might
be unable to undertake a project if it is able to borrow $70,000 rather than $80,000. One
could not determine from historical data alone how much less credit a lender would ex-
tend under a given subordination regime. It would be necessary to make estimates based
not only on the data but also on the opinions of credit analysts and rating agencies as to
how a specified subordination regime would affect credit decisions.
46 The assumption about collateral value probably is unrealistic. Conventional wis-
dom is that the actual collateral value realized in bankruptcy frequently is less than the
prebankruptcy estimated value. This is one reason why lenders often require a "cushion"
of collateral value in excess of the secured debt. We make the assumption nevertheless in
order to maximize the amount that a partial subordination rule would provide to un-
secured creditors, thereby giving the benefit of the doubt against our hypotheses. More-
over, the fact that the value of a particular item or group of collateral exceeds the secured
debt is not inconsistent with a debtor's insolvency or financial distress.
47 More precisely, the subordination rule put no more than $250,000 in the pockets of
unsecured creditors in bankruptcy. The additional amount unsecured creditors recover
depends on the amount of administrative expenses and priority claims. See Bankruptcy
Code § 726(a), 11 U.S.C. § 726(a) (1994). We believe that it is reasonable to hypothesize
this disparity between the amount of credit contraction ($12.5 million) and the increased
recoveries by unsecured creditors ($250,000). The assumed lenders that rely on a loan-to-
value ratio are risk averse and would reduce credit extensions by an amount greater than
that necessary to offset precisely their expected losses.
48 A reduction in the applicable interest rate that unsecured creditors charge also
might result.
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a material portion of the reduction of secured credit.49 Inasmuch as
secured creditors in the example insisted on reducing the amount of
available credit, such an increase in unsecured credit would occur
only if the unsecured creditors were mateially less risk averse than the
secured creditors.50
From the perspective of efficiency, one must be concerned not
only about the reduction in the amount of available credit that would
result from adoption of a subordination proposal, but also about the
nature of the projects that firms will refrain from undertaking as a
consequence of the reduction. Thus, Bebchuk and Fried pursue their
subordination proposal even though they agree that it would prevent
certain loan transactions, and thus certain projects, from going for-
ward. In part, they do so on the premise that subordination is "more
likely to prevent the financing of an inefficient activity than an effi-
49 As the following letter from a Deputy Associate Attorney General demonstrates,
interested segments of the United States federal government appear to share our intu-
itions on this subject.
This letter responds to Professor Charles Mooney's request for com-
ments on a [subordination] proposal ....
At the outset, we emphasize that-perhaps uniquely-we appreciate
the concerns the proposal seeks to address. The federal government is fre-
quently an involuntary, unsecured creditor as a result of its tax, environ-
mental clean-up, pension protection and other similar regulatory and
enforcement responsibilities. The prospect of failing businesses continuing
to operate without the unencumbered resources necessary to comply with
obligations imposed under the law threatens the effectiveness of many im-
portant federal and state statutes designed to protect public health ....
The proposed change to the Uniform Commercial Code thus responds
to a serious problem that merits further study. Nevertheless, after confer-
ring with numerous potentially affected federal agencies, we have con-
cluded that this proposal, though admittedly well intended, should not be
adopted ....
First, the effect of the proposal on the extension of credit needs fur-
ther study. The proposal could have detrimental effects on many highly
leveraged sectors of the economy, such as small business and agriculture.
Secured lenders .. .might either reduce lines of credit, demand greater
security, exact higher rates of interest or impose a combination of all three.
To the extent that lenders react by demanding greater collateral, even
more property of a borrower might become encumbered .... Ironically,
unsecured creditors could be harmed to the extent that businesses that
could otherwise survive and generate profits with the help of secured credit
are forced out of business or into bankruptcy.
These economic burdens would be imposed on all borrowers, not only
those who present the types of risks that the proposal seeks to address. As a
result, the proposal, if adopted, may well reduce the availability of private
credit to some sectors of the economy.
Letter from Francis M. Allegra, Deputy Associate Attorney General, United States Depart-
ment ofJustice, to Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Director, The American Law Institute
(March 17, 1997) (on file with authors) (footnotes omitted).
50 We realize, of course, that both the risk aversion and lending policies of creditors
vary. See Mann, supra note 36 (manuscript at 55-59) (arguing that differences in risk pref-
erences are the most plausible explanation for new lenders' willingness to extend credit to
debtors whose existing lenders have decided to terminate the lending relationship).
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cient one," and that their subordination scheme would prevent the
financing of efficient activities only in "rather rare" situations. 51
It is instructive to see why Bebchuk and Fried think this might be
true. Although their discussion, 52 which centers around a numerical
example, is far from clear, Bebchuk and Fried's argument appears to
run as follows. They hypothesize that under a full priority regime for
security interests, a particular firm can borrow $1,000,000, at an inter-
est cost of $80,000, in order to pursue a project with a "benefit to...
shareholders equal to $85,000."53 They also assume that the firm has
nonadjusting creditors that (if they could) would charge a risk pre-
mium of $10,000 as compensation for additional risk.54 Under a par-
tial priority regime, then, they assert that the prospective secured
lender would charge interest of $90,000. 55 They believe that the pro-
ject must be "inefficient," apparently because it would not be under-
taken if the firm were required to compensate all creditors with an
appropriate risk premium.56 Consequently, they conclude that
51 Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 3, at 918, 920.
52 Id at 917-21. Bebchuk and Fried's discussion of this example is not the centerpiece
of their article. The discussion is, however, their principal consideration of the effects of
their subordination proposals on investment and contraction of credit, the principal focus
of this Article.
53 Id. at 918. The meaning of "benefit to shareholders" is unclear. Bebchuk and
Fried assume that the shareholders will use a portion of this "benefit" to pay interest to the
secured creditor. Id at 918-19. Apparently, then, the term means the net expected value
of the project before paying interest to the secured creditor (but after paying interest to
the unsecured creditor).
54 Id. at 918.
55 Id.
56 Id at 919. The example is troublesome in that the nonadjusting unsecured credi-
tor is the government. Why Bebchuk and Fried consider the government to be nonadjust-
ing is unclear, given the government's power to establish legal rules that adjust its risk as
events transpire. For example, the government can enact a statute providing that every
time a taxpayer grants a security interest, the government automatically acquires a lien pari
passu on the encumbered asset to secure tax obligations. The use of the government in
this example is troublesome also because the inefficiency turns on the notion that, were
the government able to adjust to the firm's having incurred secured debt, it would not
have become a creditor unless it received a particular rate of return. But what is the appro-
priate rate of return for the government? Finally, the foresight Bebchuk and Fried attri-
bute to the firm in the example (the firm knows that it will earn $85,000 if it borrows
$1,000,000 to pursue a project and will decline the project if its interest costs will exceed
that amount) appears inconsistent with their (more plausible) assumption elsewhere that a
firm has no certain knowledge concerning the wealth consequences of its actions. Id at
894-95 (stating that a firm's commitment "not to inefficiently encumber [an] asset...
would require that the firm know in advance that it would be inefficient to encumber
particular assets"; it is a "reasonable assumption that it is difficult to acquire this knowledge
in advance"). In Part II.B we develop our hypothesis that shifts in priority and liability
rules like those in the subordination proposals are not likely to affect the behavior of
debtors.
1362 [Vol. 82:1349
MEASURING THE SOCIAL COSTS
projects that firms are likely to undertake under full priority, but not
under partial priority, are inefficient.57
The firm's nonadjusting creditors cannot possibly suffer any
harm from the new secured credit unless the firm in fact becomes
insolvent and fails to pay the creditors' claims in full. They may be
exposed to additional risk, but that risk will be converted into harm
only as to creditors of debtors that actually fail.58 Indeed, firms that
are not likely to fail (say, 95%) and that do not actually fail (say, 98%)
would be $5,000 richer if presented with Bebchuk and Fried's choices
under full priority. Thus, those firms' nonadjusting creditors actually
may benefit from the financing.59 Furthermore, the creditors of the
firms that are likely to fail (say, 5%) or that do fail (say, 2%) are pre-
cisely the creditors that may benefit the most and may have the least
to lose from a full-priority rule.
Bebchuk and Fried address only situations in which nonadjusting
creditors would, if they could, extract a risk premium and in which,
under partial priority, a secured creditor would remain willing to
make a loan in the same amount, albeit with an additional risk pre-
mium. This incomplete vision fails to take account of many other situ-
ations, including those in which a secured creditor would refuse to
57 In part because Bebchuk and Fried's example is so unclear, we do not explore its
specifics. However, Carlson analyzes the example under alternative assumptions and ar-
gues that, under either alternative, Bebchuk and Fried fail to draw appropriate conclusions
from the numbers they posit. Carlson, supra note 11 (manuscript at 75-79).
58 See Stephen R. Perry, Risk, Harm, and Responsibility, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF TORT LAW 5 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) (explaining that risk is not harmful in itself).
The relevant risk and harm relate to nonpayment of claims. However, an awareness of the
risk of nonpayment could potentially impose some temporary disutility on a claimant that
eventually is paid in full.
59 See Harris & Mooney, supra note 2, at 2028-37; Schwarcz, supra note 3, passim.
Bebchuk and Fried appear to believe, mistakenly, that the amount of risk premium that
the creditors would have charged if they had been in a position to do so nevertheless harms
the nonadjusting creditors, who are in fact paid in full. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 3, at
894 ("Since the involuntary creditors do not have the opportunity to set the size of their
claims to reflect the possibility [i.e., by charging a risk premium] of this $7500 transfer [of
value to a secured creditor], they would actually be 'hurt' by the creation of the security
interest .... "). Moreover, as Bebchuk and Fried acknowledge, many creditors that they
include in the class of nonadjusting creditors actually are adjusting, or at least imperfectly
adjusting, creditors. For example, no one can doubt that when a government sets tax rates
it takes into account the likely uncollectible portions of the taxes. Similarly, many trade
creditors with small claims take into account uncollectible accounts in setting the price and
credit terms for their products or services. See id. at 894. They protect against loss by
charging the bad credit risks less and the good credit risks more than would be the case if
they analyzed the credit risk of each customer. Contrary to Bebchuk and Fried's claims, id.
at 894-95, these result-adjusting creditors are not disadvantaged when their debtors give
security. There may be wealth transfers from the debtors with better credit (who may pay
inappropriately high interest rates) to those with poorer credit (who pay inappropriately
low rates), but they do not necessarily reflect ex ante inefficiencies. Even "pure" tort credi-
tors may be positioned to take risk into account in some ways, for example, through deci-
sions about which products to buy, which areas in which to jog, and which airlines to fly.
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extend credit altogether or would offer to extend a smaller amount of
credit under a subordination regime. Not only is their analysis incom-
plete, it is unsatisfactory even on its own terms.
Bebchuk and Fried essentially propose to reduce risk by limiting
the secured party's access to collateral in bankruptcy.60 But if full pri-
ority in bankruptcy is wealth-enhancing, then adoption of their propo-
sal will reduce the social benefits. Bebchuk and Fried, like many
before them, proceed on the assumption that externalization of risk is
a priori to be avoided.61 As Randal Picker has explained, however,
whether externalizing risk is a good or bad thing is an empirical ques-
tion. 62 This is because the social benefits of a project include not only
the return to the producer but also the consumer surplus a project
creates, i.e., the aggregate amount by which the value of the project to
consumers exceeds its cost to them. Unless legal rules designed to
prevent externalization of risk take the consumer surplus into ac-
count, some activities having a positive net social value will not be un-
dertaken. As Picker explains:
As soon as we abandon the assumption that [an entrepreneur]
can capture all of the social benefit of her activities, we must also
abandon our policy of full internalization.... Put differently, be-
cause some benefits from the project will almost necessarily be ex-
ternalized, we need to allow some risk to be externalized. 63
Stated otherwise, complete internalization of risk-the premise un-
derlying Bebchuk and Fried's argument-has no necessary connec-
tion with wealth maximization.
B. Effects of Full Priority for Secured Credit on Externalization
of Risk and Debtor Behavior
As we outlined in Part I, several subordination proponents have
argued that affording full priority for security interests in bankruptcy
leads to suboptimal, inefficient precautions against risk.64 We hypoth-
esize that neither affording full priority to security interests nor mov-
ing to a subordination scheme has or would have a material effect on
the level of risk and precaution that debtors undertake. The follow-
ing discussion explains our hypothesis and considers the prospects for
acquiring empirical evidence to support it.
60 Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 3, at 859-67. The only way to eliminate the risk com-
pletely would be to make all security interests ineffective. We know of no one who advo-
cates this approach.
61 1d at 863-66 & n.26.
62 Randal C. Picker, Externalization 3 (Jan. 10, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with authors).
63 Id at 4.
64 See supra Part I.
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Leebron examines the effects of a firm's capital structure and the
Bankruptcy Code's priority rules on the externalization of tort risk in
a world of limited shareholder liability, as under current law.65 He
offers three examples, each involving a biotechnology firm that holds
assets of $100 million and faces a small risk that a catastrophic event
will result in $200 million in tort liability.66 He first assumes that the
firm's capital structure consists of $100 million in equity and no
debt.67 Inasmuch as the equity holders are at risk for no more than
$100 million under a limited-liability regime, the firm has external-
ized $100 million of potential tort liability.68 Leebron then posits that
the firm has only $50 million in equity and has borrowed $50 million
from a financial creditor. 69 In this case, the $100 million in assets
would be distributed pro rata to the holders of the $250 million of
claims. 70 The tort claimants would receive $80 million, yielding a
$120 million shortfall, and the financial creditor would receive $20
million, yielding a $30 million shortfall.71 Compared to the first ex-
ample, then, an additional $20 million of tort liability has been exter-
nalized.72 Finally, Leebron varies the second example by assuming
that the $50 million of financial debt is fully secured.73 Under that
scenario, the financial debt would be paid in full, leaving $50 million
of assets for the $200 million tort claimants and resulting in a $150
million shortfall or $150 million of tort liability that has been
externalized. 74
Leebron's observations are not unconventional in economic anal-
ysis. As the potential tort claims absorb more risk and the equity hold-
ers face less, the stakes shrink for the latter. This is said to reduce the
deterrent effects of tort liability and the precautions firms will take to
avoid it. Apparently, Leebron thinks that the hypothetical debtor that
acquires $50 million of secured debt instead of $50 million of equity
65 Leebron, supra note 4, at 1636-49. Under a legal regime imposing unlimited share-
holder liability, Leebron observes that the bankruptcy priority rules would be irrelevant, as
the firms could not externalize tort risk unless their assets were insufficient to satisfy the
claims. Id at 1637-38 & n.216.
66 Id. at 1639.
67 d.
68 See id.
69 Id
70 See id. at 1639-40.
71 See id. at 1640. Leebron apparently does not deem relevant the fact that until the
tort liability actually materializes, the contingent liability would not be valued at $200 mil-
lion, but at a fraction of that amount, representing the likelihood that the liability would
accrue.
72 See id.
7 3 Id.
74 See id
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will engage in behavior that is 50% more risky (the ratio of $150 of
externalized risk to $100 of externalized risk).7-5
Leebron advances four reasons that support subordinating finan-
cial creditors (both secured and unsecured) to tort claimants: (i) fi-
nancial creditors can more easily diversify losses than tort creditors,
(ii) decreasing the negative externality created by corporate limited
liability will cause more efficient management decisions and "fewer
unjustified tort risks," (iii) a subordination rule "would restore capital
structure neutrality" for tort risks, and (iv) "creditors will have an in-
creased incentive to monitor corporate tort risks." 76 We focus here on
the second and fourth reasons, which together address incentives for
firms to alter their behavior and take sufficient precautions against
causing injury.77 Leebron concludes that modifying bankruptcy prior-
ity rules by subordinating financial claims, including secured claims,
to tort claims would reduce tortious behavior as well as increase assets
available to satisfy claims.78 The additional assets would result from
financial creditors' monitoring assets.79
Leebron's conclusions necessarily depend on an unstated as-
sumption that contemporary tort law has a deterrent effect on solvent
firms with no financial creditors-those whose shareholders have the
most at stake.80 But Leebron's assumption, which he leaves both un-
stated and unexamined, is problematic at best. Although no one
75 Would it follow that if Leebron's hypothetical debtor had only $5 million in equity
and $5 million in debt, it would be ten times less careful than a debtor with $50 million in
debt because it would have less to lose? Leebron does not explain whether he is making
only relative comparisons, viewing externalized debt as it relates to total assets or total
equity. We also note in passing that Leebron's hypothetical firms are likely to differ mate-
rially in respects other than their capital structures. Reasons other than fortuity or whimsy
likely are responsible for one firm having no debt and another firm having debt equal to
50% of its total assets.
76 Id. at 1643.
77 As for the first reason, we note only that adjusting the priority of claims against an
insolvent debtor seems unlikely to be the most effective or efficient method of spreading
losses.
78 Id. at 1643-50.
79 See id. at 1644-45.
8o Leebron (as well as LoPucki, Bebchuk, and Fried, who followed him) failed to ex-
amine the operation of and justifications for tort liability. Another advocate of tort credi-
tor priority, however, has recognized that the priority debate cannot ignore the basis for
tort liability itself and the operation of the liability system in practice. See Andrew Price,
Note, Tort Creditor Superpriority and Other Proposed Solutions to Corporate Limited Liability and
the Problem of Externalities, 2 GEo. MASON L. R~v. 439 (1995).
This paper assumes that the American tort law system functions effi-
ciently. Therefore, this paper assumes that the tort creditor problem poses
a real problem which needs a solution beyond a change in the tort law
system. However, it is quite possible that the tort creditor problem only
exists because of misincentives in the American tort law system. In that
case, it may be unreasonable to impose the costs of the following proposal
on the business community, when a less expensive solution may be found in
tort reform.
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doubts that the potential for tort liability has some deterrent effects,8 '
the standard economic account of tort liability rules, -based on exter-
nalization of risk and deterrence, has been roundly criticized and sub-
stantially discredited. Professor Stephen Sugarman's critique is
particularly trenchant.8 2 Sugarman identifies two cognition-related
weaknesses in the deterrence argument. He explains that many actors
are uninformed of both the law (which will not surprise torts teach-
ers) as well as the facts necessary to apply it.83 As Sugarman points
out, no one could really expect market actors to understand fully
either the details of the liability rules or the particular kinds of behav-
ior that violate those rules.8 4 Individuals-on their own account or as
managers of firms-simply cannot determine with reasonable cer-
tainty whether particular conduct will create liability. Thus, not only
do solvent firms commit torts, but in many cases, incurring the liabil-
ity is not in the interest of the tortfeasors. With hindsight, Ford might
have been well advised to take additional precautions against danger-
ous gasoline tanks in Pintos. Taking additional precautions might
have been in the best interests of Ford's management and sharehold-
ers alike. But how would Ford have been confident about the quan-
tum of risk or that a range of precautions would be either inadequate
or excessive? Sugarman further explains that, even when individuals
and organizations recognize and act upon a risk, often they are in-
competent to achieve success.85 He also rebuts the argument that un-
certainty itself necessarily leads to precaution.
Id. at 440-41 (footnote omitted). Price recognized that before one can reach the point of
actually advocating the subordination proposals to lawmakers, one first must defend suc-
cessfully the efficiency of the tort system. Having failed even to recognize this point, the
subordination proposals obviously have not yet met this burden.
81 See Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really
Deter, 42 UCLA L. REv. 377, 378, 390-423 (1994) (setting forth a moderate form of the
deterrence argument-tort law provides some meaningful deterrence, but much less than
economists' formulae suggest).
82 STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY wITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW 3-24 (1989).
Sugarman also critically examines the other commonly asserted accounts of tort law, prin-
cipally compensation-based and justice-based rationales. Id. at 35-49, 55-68. Sugarman is
not alone in his skepticism about deterrence theory. See, e.g., IzHAK ENGLARD, THE PHILOS-
OPHY OF TORT LAW 43-44 (1993); John A. Siliciano, Corporate Behavior and the Social Effi-
dency of Tort Law, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1820, 1820-22 (1987). Skeptics of the efficiency of
existing tort law as a deterrent are not limited to those writing outside the law-and-econom-
ics tradition. See, e.g., Jason S. Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of Efficiency in
Tort Law, 87 COLuM. L. Rxv. 1385, 1392 (1987) (proposing a system of higher liability
standards and higher penalties in order to accommodate errors by decisionmakers "in in-
terpreting the standard, or in resolving the factual issues," which, under current law, result
in nonliability for some who fall to comply with the legal standard and liability for some
who do comply).
83 SuGARMaN, supra note 82, at 6-9.
84 Id
85 Id. at 8-9. Sugarman also identifies other factors that undermine the deterrent
effect of tort law: (i) the tendency to discount threats of liability, (ii) the high stakes of
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[F] or most potential defendants, liability insurance ... has largely
vitiated this argument. Besides, many parties will simply ignore the
tiny possibility of a crushing financial loss in the way that people or
companies ignore the chance that they might be killed or destroyed
by an unexpected natural disaster. Alternatively, if they dwell on
this risk, people are apt to develop socially undesirable defense
strategies or to exercise excessive caution and fail to engage in so-
cially beneficial activities. Finally, even if enterprises and individu-
als were to try to respond to an indeterminate likelihood of
crushing liability, they would not know what amount of precaution
to take.8 6
In sum, neither firms nor the individuals who manage them are the
fully informed, rational actors that Leebron would hope them to be.
If the threat of liability under the rippled surface of law and fact
generally serves as a poor (or, at best, a crude) deterrent, in part as a
result of the cognitive issues that Sugarman advances, it follows that
tinkering with the edges of bankruptcy priority rules could not possi-
bly provide an effective one. If a firm's management cannot accu-
rately predict the results of taking or failing to take particular
precautions, it is even more unlikely that management could create
material reductions in risk by taking into account the amounts of the
firm's unsecured debts and secured debt as they relate to the firm's
capital.8 7 And if management is not likely to react predictably and
accurately to these marginal externalizations of risk, then the claim
that monitoring by financial creditors will somehow play a meaningful
role in directing behavior is virtually self-refuting.8 8
potentially dangerous activity, (iii) the likelihood that in fact only a small penalty will be
exacted for tortious behavior, and (iv) the effect of liability insurance. Id at 9-18.
86 Id at 8. Arguably, Leebron recognized that uncertainty might play a role in the
analysis, but he did not consider it. Leebron, supra note 4, at 1636 n.212 (acknowledging
that his article does not address the possible effects of fact-finding uncertainty).
87 See Schwartz, supra note 81, at 379 ("[L]egal economists [should] de-emphasize
their efforts to fine-tune liability rules in order to achieve perfect deterrence. Given the
imprecision in the processes by which tort liability affects behavior, these efforts at fine-
tuning, though intellectually challenging, are likely to be socially irrelevant."). That tort
law is such a blunt deterrent does not prove the desirability of current law, which generally
provides for full priority of security interests. However, it illustrates that any differences in
deterrence between current law and the subordination proposals would be trivial. We re-
emphasize that we do not question that managers of firms appreciate the potential for tort
liability and take precautions based on that appreciation. What we question is the predic-
tion that the shifts in priority rules contemplated by the subordination proposals would
materially affect actual behavior. Although leverage, whether secured or unsecured, may
create an opportunity for managers to externalize risk, we doubt that managers in fact
could accurately calculate, compare, and take account of these marginal externalizations
of risks.
88 We reserve for another day any comment on the asset monitoring that Leebron
contemplates financial creditors will provide under a subordination regime. We note,
however, that anecdotal evidence suggests that, even under the current full-priority re-
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We do not dispute that when equity holders, management, or fi-
nancial creditors have much at stake, the level of precaution and mon-
itoring may be materially more significant than when they have little
at stake. What we question, however, is whether variations in the pros-
pects that third parties will be required to absorb tort liability can be
translated into reliable and predictable variations in behavior.89 Per-
haps Leebron, LoPucki, Bebchuk, and Fried should focus their con-
cerns on the continued operation of businesses whose owners and
managers may have relatively little to lose, such as insolvent or nearly
insolvent firms. Professor Siliciano makes the point well:
[I ort reform holds limited potential for correcting the problems
caused by evasive behavior. New rules generate new evasions. And
although compliance may increase marginally with each expansion
of liability rules, such improvements are likely to be offset, at least in
part, by the decreased efficiency of transactions designed to avoid
the new rules. Moreover, even with global rules, tort's basic mecha-
nism for controlling conduct-the threat of future liability-is in-
herently limited. The effectiveness of such a final threat ultimately
depends on whether the actor has something to lose. But tort law is
powerless to guarantee that actors will want to, or be able to, stay in
business. Put more crudely, the law is powerless to ensure that all
actors make enough money so that they are concerned about the
prospect of losing it through liabilityjudgments. Thus, even if tort
law could proscribe all lesser evasions, it can do little to alter the
conduct of enterprises entering the final, natural refuge of
insolvency.90
We do not take lightly efforts to curb the problems associated with the
operation of undercapitalized and insolvent firms. Nevertheless, we
suspect that it is extremely unlikely that adjustments in the priority
rules for secured debt would provide an effective remedy for this
gime, secured creditors are hardly indifferent about whether their debtors incur tort
liability.
89 We also question whether internalizing tort costs necessarily maximizes wealth.
Traditional economic analyses, like those undertaken by Leebron, supra note 4, LoPucki,
supra note 2, and Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 3, propose to deter through tort law all
conduct that causes a loss to victims that is greater than the costs of preventing or spread-
ing the loss. However, this analysis is deficient because it fails to take account of all the
social benefits of the tortious conduct. See Picker, supra note 62, at 3-6.
90 Siliciano, supra note 82, at 1859 (footnote omitted). LoPucki recently elaborated
on the various means by which judgment-proofing strategies can be achieved under long-
standing legal principles. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE LJ. 1, 14-38
(1996). The issues of (1) whether American businesses have begun to utilize judgment-
proofing strategies with increasing frequency and (2) whether those businesses are likely to
continue to use those strategies in the future has been the subject of some debate. Compare
id (arguing thatjudgment-proofing has become increasingly commonplace and is likely to
become even more so in the future) withJamesJ. White, Ignorant and Unashamed (1997)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (arguing that widespread judgment-proof-
ing by commercial firms is only theoretically possible).
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problem. 91 A more likely candidate for reform is the most obvious
source of responsibility for perpetuating insolvent firms' operations-
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Empirical testing of our hypotheses concerning the behavioral ef-
fects (or lack thereof) of both current law and a subordination regime
will be enormously difficult.9 2 One initial approach that we intend to
explore is the examination of relevant literature and data from the
cognitive sciences, decision theory, and management studies.93 In a
recent paper, Cass Sunstein has made a compelling argument for fur-
ther behavioral research in the analysis of law, and in particular in the
economic analysis of law.94 We also might consider a more forensic
study of data concerning actual debtors that have and have not in-
curred material tort liability. At this point, we can note only our pessi-
mism about ascertaining likely behavioral effects of capital and debt
structure from such data. We contrast this pessimism with our consid-
erably more optimistic views about demonstrating the likely effects of
a subordination rule on the availability of credit. In addition to the
availability of more accessible and relevant data, we expect to find that
the bases for decisions concerning requests for extensions of credit
from professional creditors are substantially more standardized, for-
malized, and memorialized.
91 Stated otherwise, we hypothesize that the positive externalities that Leebron,
LoPucki, Bebchuk, and Fried would expect from adopting a subordination proposal would
be minor.
92 See Siliciano, supra note 82, at 1821-22.
[The social efficiency] model of tort law posits that producers who might
otherwise face inadequate incentives to act with care will, if saddled
through liability rules with the costs of injuries caused by defective prod-
ucts, seek to reduce such costs to optimal levels in order to remain
competitive....
Indeed, the narcotic effect of the social efficiency model of tort is so
strong that one easily forgets that it is simply a model, and one that has
never been empirically tested.... [T]he most comprehensive study of cor-
porate responses to tort liability found that the actual operations of the tort
system, rather than encouraging producers to take optimal care, instead
produced only an "indistinct signal" largely devoid of useful guidance.
Id. (footnotes omitted). The study that Professor Siliciano relies upon is GEORGE EADs &
PETER REUTER, THE INST. FOR Crv. JUST., DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS-CORPORATE RE-
SPONSES TO PRODUCr LtABItrr LAW AND REGULATION (1983). Professor Siliciano observed
that "[testing of the model may be impossible" and expressed doubt whether "the end
result of such efficiency-enhancing moves will be a system capable of optimizing product
safety." Siliciano, supra note 82, at 1821 n.4 (citing William M. Landes & Richard A. Pos-
ner, A Positive Economic Analysis of Products Liability, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 535, 551-53 (1985)
(concluding that courts move from less efficient to more efficient rules as circumstances
dictate)).
93 See Albert W. Chau & James G. Phillips, Effects of Perceived Control Upon Wagering and
Attributions in Computer Blackjack, 122J. GEN. PSYCHOL. 253 (1995) (comparing probabilistic
and cognitive theories of risk-taking behavior).
94 Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. (forthcoming 1997).
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CONCLUSION
We have sketched our hypotheses concerning two significant as-
pects of proposals to subordinate secured claims to tort and other
claims in bankruptcy: (i) the social costs of contraction of credit that
might attend adoption of the subordination proposals, and (ii) the
effects of adopting the subordination proposals on the externalization
of risk and the (claimed) attendant increases in precaution. We also
have outlined our current thinking about how to obtain empirical evi-
dence to test our hypotheses. Our reflections have taken the subordi-
nation proposals on their own terms, based on their stated goals of
enhancing efficiency and maximizing wealth. But the empirical inves-
tigation that interests us may suggest other normative considerations
that adoption of the subordination proposals would implicate.
Consider the demographics of the group of debtors for which
adoption of the subordination proposals would most likely cause re-
ductions in extensions of credit. For example, data may confirm that
small businesses (and, accordingly, minority-owned businesses) would
disproportionately comprise that group.95 Many observers would see
that fact as support for a normative case against the subordination
proposals, even if the proposals were demonstrably sound on effi-
ciency grounds. Certainly those findings would explain the nearly
universal lack of support for the subordination proposals in the cur-
rent revision of UCC Article 9.
As a political matter, the subordination proposals have no realis-
tic prospects for widespread support and adoption. Entrepreneurship
is an indelible feature of the American social fabric. Even assuming
that hiking the price of admission to the business marketplace would
promote efficiency, so that only those with substantial unleveraged
capital could afford to participate (a dubious assumption), many-
perhaps most-would shrink from the prospect. In the end, the
95 Conventional wisdom holds that smaller businesses are more likely to obtain se-
cured credit than larger businesses. The results of the recently published survey, con-
ducted by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, bears this out. Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finances
(visited Sept. 24, 1997), <http://wwiv.bog.frb.fed.us/boarddocs/surveys>. The size of a
business bears a high correlation with the presence of collateral in financing the business,
with smaller businesses more likely to give security. Telephone Interview with Rebel A.
Cole, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (May 29, 1997). Minority owner-
ship of a business also correlates highly with size; minority businesses generally are smaller.
Id. It is plausible to hypothesize that the reduction of credit following adoption of a subor-
dination scheme would fall disproportionately on businesses owned by women and mem-
bers of racial minorities. We have not tested this hypothesis here, and the data do not
necessarily prove this hypothesis. Our point is more basic. Proponents of law reforms that,
if adopted, would reduce available credit should take into account the likely victims of the
reductions. We do not claim here, however, that current law is necessarily the optimal
means of supporting small businesses.
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needs and aspirations of the market participants-from the small
businesses on Main Street to the economic engines on Wall Street-
will prevail.96
96 Any serious approach to law reform, as opposed to scholarship for its sake alone,
cannot ignore the political landscape. See Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 MICH. L. REv. 47 (1997) (analyzing the legislative and intellec-
tual history of the Act from a public choice perspective); MarkJ. Roe, A Political Theory of
American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 10 (1991) (observing that American corpo-
rate ownership and management can be explained only by understanding prevailing polit-
ical influences, such as concerns about permitting financial institutions to invest in and
control industrial firms). Well intentioned as they may be, the subordination proposals are
widely seen as a broadside assault on small business. See, e.g., Letter from Francis M. Al-
legra to Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., supra note 49. We suspect that the data will bear this out.
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